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ARTICLES
Human Rights and Dignity in Offender
Rehabilitation
TONY WARD, PhD
School of Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand
The concept of human rights is a moral (and legal) one that
that is intended to safeguard provision of the social, economic,
environmental, and psychological goods necessary for a dignified
human life. Over the last 3 years, several papers on the implica-
tions of rights-based thinking for the assessment and treatment of
offenders have appeared. In this paper, I draw from this work—in
particular, the conceptual model developed by Ward and Birgden
(2007)—and examine its practice recommendations and implica-
tions. First, I analyze the concept of dignity and its role in human
rights thinking. Then the Ward and Birgden model of human
rights is outlined and ethically justified. Finally, I discuss some of
the major assessment and treatment consequences of this human
rights approach.
KEYWORDS human rights, correctional practice
INTRODUCTION
Individuals who commit serious offences inflict unjustified harm on innocent
members of the community and, by doing so, set back their core interests
to a considerable degree. The subsequent capacity of victims to enjoy their
lives is typically undermined, and they may also suffer from a number of
serious emotional and financial problems. One of the ways in which the
unacceptability of what offenders have done is demonstrated by their fellow
citizens by subjecting them to punishment. Punishment in the criminal justice
Address correspondence to Tony Ward, School of Psychology, Victoria University of
Wellington, PO Box 600, Wellington, 6140 New Zealand. E-mail: tony.ward@vuw.ac.nz
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system has five necessary elements (Boonin, 2008): Punishment practices
are authorized by the state; intentional; reprobative (they express disap-
proval or censure); retributive (they follow a wrongful act committed by the
offender); and harmful (they result in suffering, a burden, or deprivation
imposed on the offender). In addition to punishment, offenders are also
frequently offered the opportunity to turn their lives around by entering
rehabilitation programs that are designed to equip them with essential living
and coping skills (Ward & Maruna, 2007). For example, vocational programs
aim to help offenders acquire employment-related skills whereas treatment
programs set out to reduce risk factors and develop core psychological and
social competencies (Andrews & Bonta, 2003; Levenson & D’Amora, 2005).
The existence of two such overlapping but distinct normative frameworks
that oversee the punishment and rehabilitation of offenders is a notable
feature of correctional practice and poses unique challenges for clinicians
(Glaser, 2003; Ward & Salmon, 2009).
I do not have the space in this paper to systematically explore the
degree to which punishment and rehabilitation practices interweave within
clinical work with offenders and instead zero in on a core assumption shared
by both these frameworks: the intrinsic worth or dignity of all human beings
(Darwell, 2006; Duff, 2001; Griffin, 2008; Lazarus, 2004; Lippke, 2002; Ward
& Syversen, 2009). In brief, human beings are assumed to possess intrinsic
value, which ought to be evident in the way they live and are treated by
other people. Thus, rehabilitation initiatives should be geared toward ensur-
ing that every individual has the necessary capabilities to fashion a good or
better life (what is considered a minimally worthwhile life) whereas pun-
ishment practices need to be implemented in ways that reflect their dignity.
Human rights are theoretically grounded in the concept of dignity and can
be conceptualized as moral (and their associated legal) norms that protect
the core interests and needs constituting human dignity (Griffin, 2008; Ward
& Syvsersen, 2009).
There has been relatively little ethical writing on forensic and correc-
tional research and practice, and work that has been published tends to
cluster around procedural issues such as duty to warn or conflicts of interest
(Bush, Connell, & Denny, 2006; Haag, 2006; Ward & Birgden, 2007). Within
this comparative ethical vacuum, even less has been published on the topic
of human rights and their application to offender rehabilitation (Ward &
Birdgen 2007). There are, however, signs that this situation is changing and,
over the last 3 years, several papers on the implications of rights-based
thinking for the assessment and treatment of offenders have appeared (e.g.,
Day & Ward, 2010; Vess, 2009; Ward & Langlands, 2009; Ward & Moreton,
2008). My intention in this paper is to draw from this work, in particular, the
conceptual model developed by myself and to examine its practice recom-
mendations and implications. First, I analyze the concept of dignity and its
role in human rights thinking. Then the Ward and Birgden model of human
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rights is outlined and ethically justified. Finally, I discuss some of the major
assessment and treatment consequences of our human rights approach and
make a few suggestions about ways of working with offenders that are
dignity-enhancing.
DIGNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
The Concept of Human Dignity
The concept of human dignity is an old ethical idea that has at its center
the claim that every human being has intrinsic worth and is equal in this
respect (Islay, 2004; Sulmasy, 2007). Initially, it was accepted that individ-
uals’ level of dignity varied according to their social status, with peasants
considered inferior to nobles or clergy. However, with the event of mod-
ern liberal thought in the seventeenth century, a sea change in meaning
was discernible. Rather than high value being exclusively associated with
individuals of elevated social rank, all human beings were regarded as if
they were aristocrats or royalty. This shift in the meaning of the term dig-
nity in modern times, and its close link with the concept of rights, is nicely
expressed by Waldron (2009, p. 2):
Dignity, we are told, was once tied up with rank: the dignity of a king
was not the same as the dignity of bishop and neither of them was the
same as the dignity of a professor. If our modern conception of human
dignity retains any scintilla of its ancient and historical connection with
rank- and I think it does: I think it expresses the idea of the high and
equal rank of every human person. . . . Dignity is intimately connected
with the idea of rights as the ground of rights, and the content of certain
rights, and perhaps even the form and structural character of rights.
Because of their inherent dignity, human beings are assumed to possess
equal moral status and therefore are expected to receive due consideration
in matters that directly affect their core interests. If we all matter equally,
it is incumbent on each of us to think about how our actions are likely to
affect the people around us, both close and distant. The possibility of their
experiencing unjustified harm as a consequence of our actions should func-
tion as a red flag and prompt us to reflect on how or whether we should
proceed with our planned course of action (Driver, 2006). Furthermore, the
equal moral standing of each person within a community means that every
person is entitled to make specific claims against other members of the
moral community and, in turn, is expected to acknowledge his or her obli-
gations to others respective legitimate claims. These claims will concern
the goods they are entitled to as members of the community, especially
ones that are regarded as essential for securing their core interests and
needs.
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The pivotal role of the concept of human dignity in regulating human
relationships and coordinating competing interests is evident in most major
moral theories and various human rights treaties such as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR; United Nations, 1948). The preamble
of the UDHR asserts that “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation
of freedom, justice and peace in the world.” The UDHR was followed by the
European Convention on Human Rights (which came into force in 1953; Smit
& Snacken, 2009) and two international covenants in 1966 (the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights) that provided more detail on the var-
ious articles outlined in the original UN declaration (Freeman, 2002). There
are also references to human dignity in the various articles of the UDHR
and in the other treaties and in the many books and commentaries on these
important human rights documents. It is apparent that from the standpoint
of the authors of the UDHR, human dignity is a core moral idea rather than
primarily a legal concept and therefore theoretically grounds or justifies laws
and political norms that are designed to protect fundamental human needs
and interests (Churchill, 2006).
Though modern thinkers commonly accepted that the term dignity
refers to human worth, it has been formulated in a variety of ways, creat-
ing some degree of conceptual confusion (Beyleveld & Brownsword, 2001;
Malpas & Lickiss, 2007; Miller, 2007; Nussbaum, 2006). For example, some
of the many ways the term has been defined include: (a) the minimal liv-
ing conditions required for an acceptable level of existence for a human
being; (b) a life lived in accordance with the norms of a local commu-
nity and its practices and traditions; (c) the degree to which a person
is free to form his or her own intentions and is able to act in accor-
dance with them without interference; (d) whether individuals are fulfilling
themselves as human beings and their unique abilities are fully devel-
oped. Beyleveld and Brownsword (2001) have brought some degree of
coherence to the definitional confusion by suggesting that there are two
major strands evident in the plethora of definitions of dignity: empower-
ment and constraint. The empowerment strand stresses the importance of
uncoerced choice and freedom of movement for human beings as they
go about their lives, essentially an autonomy component. The constraint
strand emphasizes the basic conditions that must be met if people are to
live dignified lives; this is a well-being component. The constraints are
those relating to the nature of their actions and the way they are treated
by others; for example, being provided with a certain (minimal) level
of health care, social respect, education, nutrition (food, water), safety,
and accommodation and acting in ways that are considered appropri-
ate. Thus, a dignified life is one wherein a person is able to act as an
autonomous human being and has his or her basic needs and interests met.
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Furthermore, each individual is expected to behave in ways that reflects his
or her (high) intrinsic worth and treat others similarly. Later on, it becomes
apparent that the major purpose of human rights is to protect the per-
sonal, social, economic, and environmental conditions that ensure human
dignity.
Human Rights
So far, I have argued for the crucial ethical role of the concept of dignity in
correctional and forensic practice. In fact, dignity is a valuable ethical con-
cept because it is acknowledged as foundational by many individuals whose
specific moral theories and codes diverge and therefore it is ideally placed
to function as an integrative concept for ethical reasoning in these domains
(Ward & Syversen, 2009). Furthermore, in line with other theorists, I have
proposed that there is a close connection between dignity and human rights
but that it is not sufficient to ground practice on its own. What is needed
in addition is the specification of norms that are designed to protect the
empowerment and well-being requirements that comprise dignity. The con-
cept of human rights is a moral (and legal) one that that can fulfil this role by
virtue of its ability to safeguard the provision of the social, economic, envi-
ronmental, and psychological goods necessary for a dignified human life.
The relationship between values and human rights is beautifully captured
by Freeden (1991):
. . . a human right is a conceptual device, expressed in linguistic form,
that assigns priority to certain human or social attributes regarded as
essential to the adequate functioning of a human being; that is intended
to serve as a protective capsule for those attributes; and that appeal for
deliberate action to ensure such protection (p. 7).
Human rights are typically cast in a universal form, and it is assumed
that they apply to all human beings by virtue of their underlying com-
mon needs based on the fact of embodiment, environmental conditions,
and related interests (Gewirth, 1981, 1996; Griffin, 2008; Ishay, 2004; Orend,
2002). In his recent text, Nickel (2007) identifies a number of key human
rights features. They
● are universal and extend to all peoples of the world;
● are moral norms that provide strong reasons for granting individual
significant benefits;
● exert normative force through both national and international institutions;
● are evident in both specific lists of rights and at the level of abstract values;
and
● set minimum standards of living rather than depicting an ideal world.
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How are human rights defined? Most theorists assert that human rights
are claim rights possessed by all human beings that guarantee them access to
certain goods such as food or education and to be able to engage in specific
types of actions such as free speech or freedom of movement (Griffin, 2008;
Morsink, 2009; Orend, 2002). These rights can be positive, in that someone
has an obligation to supply the goods in question, or negative, whereby
there is an obligation not to interfere with someone’s activities. In short, a
claim right has the following necessary elements (Hohfeld, 1919): a rights
holder, the assertion of a claim, an object of the claim (e.g., education),
the recipient of the claim (i.e., duty bearer), and the grounds for the claim.
Thus, holders of human rights have both obligations to others to provide
specific sets of goods and, in turn, have entitlements to the various goods
in question. The two concepts are inextricably linked; there is little sense in
the idea of human rights entitlements without the corresponding notion of
obligation. Each human being who possesses the necessary psychological
competencies is both a rights holder and a duty bearer.
As stated earlier, the ground for rights claims reside in the nature of
human beings and the fact that to live a dignified life, they require a number
of goods and services. From this perspective, the only variables of ethical
relevance are basic human needs, conditions, and interests, and factors such
as social class, professional group, culture, racial group, gender, or sexual
orientation are deemed irrelevant. The allocation of goods and social assets
on the basic of these irrelevant factors amounts to discrimination and, as
such, is unjust (Miller, 2007). A dignified life is one characterized by per-
sonal choice and a certain level of well-being. To achieve such a life, it
is necessary that certain well-being and freedom goods are available to the
person (Gewirth, 1996; Griffin, 2008; Miller, 2007).
It is possible to trace the origins of human rights from middle-Eastern
legal codes to their modern manifestation in natural rights inspired decla-
rations such as the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen
(Donnelly, 2003; Islay, 2004; Mahoney, 2007). Eventually the enlightenment
versions culminated in the publication of the UDHR in 1948 with its focus
more on human dignity than natural law (United Nations, 1948). The UDHR
consists of a preamble expressing the inherent dignity of human beings and
30 articles specifying rights to objects such as freedom from torture, security
of the person, a fair trial and due process, right to own property, freedom of
speech, freedom from discrimination, freedom to marry, the right to work,
and religious freedom (United Nations, 1948). As stated, the UDHR was fol-
lowed by two international covenants in 1966 (the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights) that provided more detail on the various arti-
cles outlined in the original UN declaration (Nickel, 2007). The multitude
of human rights articles in the UDHR has been usefully collapsed into five
basic categories of goods by the Canadian philosopher Brian Orend (2002):
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personal freedom, material subsistence, personal security, elemental equal-
ity, and social recognition. In my view, these clusters of goods can be further
divided into well-being and freedom goods, which are necessary elements
of human dignity (see next). This basic insight is the foundation of the Ward
and Birgden (2007) model of human rights.
JUSTIFICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
So far, I have identified the key features of human rights and defined them
as claim rights that confer both obligations and entitlements on all human
beings. However, how can they be justified? In other words, is there a way
of arguing for the ethical legitimacy for human rights without being accused
of being dogmatic and simply parroting a favorite theoretical or ideological
theory to support them? There has been plenty of ink spilled on this vex-
ing question but, in my view, the most convincing defenses are based on
appeals to human needs, interests, and autonomy; the core components of
human dignity (see Ward & Birgden for an in-depth justification of human
rights). For example, Gewirth (1981, 1996) argues that human rights safe-
guard the necessary social, psychological, physical, and economic conditions
for people to operate as moral agents: that is, as individuals capable of decid-
ing what their basic values are and working out personally meaningful ways
of achieving them in their lives. Because the conditions that underpin the
capacity to act in such ways are so fundamental and without them people
would be powerless to act upon their own desires and to implement their
associated personal life plans, they are protected by human rights. However,
once people assert their entitlements (i.e., claim the goods in question from
others or the state) to the range of goods and service necessary to act in
pursuit of their goals, they are logically obligated to respect other peoples’
similar claims. They are obligated in this way because other people are in
exactly the same position as they are and are also dependent upon cer-
tain well-being and freedom goods to be able to function independently in
the world. From Gewirth’s viewpoint, a life characterized by the capacity to
function in this way is a dignified life; a life fit for a human being. A life
missing these basic ingredients would be an unworthy one, a blighted and
unreasonably impoverished existence.
According to theorists, human rights impose both positive and nega-
tive duties on states and other people, which they are ethically obligated
to meet within certain practical constraints (e.g., they have the resources
and/or abilities to meet the claim). Furthermore, when there are conflicting
interests and demands arising from individuals’ human right claims, it is nec-
essary to evaluate each claim with respect to its importance and to arrive at a
solution that represents a balance between the entitlements of all individuals
concerned. Sometimes, it may not be possible to satisfy all just entitlements,
and the respective duties may be prioritized according to their degree of
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need or urgency. However, in this situation, we should acknowledge the
subsequent ethical problems and do our best to achieve a fair outcome
whereby the entitlements of all persons involved are taken into account and
their various obligations noted. Because all human beings possess inherent
worth and thus ought to count equally when it comes to allocating the array
of goods and services required for a dignified life, no one should be arbi-
trarily excluded or overlooked. The violation of human rights occurs when
individuals’ legitimate claims are overlooked or excluded in such ways; in
a sense, they are treated primarily as means to other people’s goals rather
than as valued agents themselves. An example of being treated simply as a
means to others goals occurs when immigrants from a certain ethnic group
are denied basic health services because of the expense to the state and yet
are exploited as sources of cheap labour. A correctional example could be
when sex offenders are placed on a public register and their privacy is vio-
lated because it makes members of the community feel safer in the absence
of evidence that such a strategy actually is effective in reducing the threat of
future offending (Vess, 2009).
In summary, human rights protect the conditions necessary for individu-
als to lead lives of dignity. Human rights are entitlements held by all human
beings, including offenders, and are balanced by the obligations of other
people to provide the goods in question and/or to refrain from unjustifi-
ably interfering with peoples’ actions. Any restriction of individuals’ human
rights runs the risk on impugning their dignity and is to be avoided. And if
some degree of restriction is ethically justifiable, as in the case of offenders,
they should be reasonable and not be unduly harsh and demeaning. As an
aside, it has been noted by a range of researchers and commentators that
this is rarely true for offenders and that too often legitimate claims to a life
of dignity are ignored and unnecessarily harsh, and restrictive conditions are
imposed on them (Hudson, 2001; Lazarus; 2004; Lippke, 2002; McCarthy,
2010).
THE WARD AND BIRGDEN MODEL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The Ward and Birgden (2007) human rights model is based on the HDHR,
Orend’s (2002) analysis of human rights, and the work of theorists such
as Gewirth (1996), Miller (2007), Nussbaum (2006), and Beyleveld and
Brownsword (2001). It is best visually described as a bulls eye with three lay-
ers that represent abstract core values protected by human rights and their
ultimate operationalization into more-specific rights evident in documents
such as the UDHR. The outermost layer contains human rights treaties and
protocols such as the UDHR or conventions securing the rights of prisoners.
Basically, any legal document or correctional agencies’ lists of rules can be
placed in this layer. It represents the most concrete and visible manifesta-
tion of human rights and documents, which are typically the ones clinicians
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are most familiar with. In addition, professional codes of ethics that refer
to human rights are also placed in the outer layer (Ward, Gannon, & Vess,
2009). Thus, human rights take a legal or quasi-legal form in the outer layer.
The second layer is more abstract and contains Orend’s five categories of
primary goods derived from the UDHR. At the middle and innermost layers,
human rights are best viewed as moral rights as they are more abstract in
nature and more readily reflect ethical principles and their associated val-
ues. The innermost circle contains the concept of human dignity and its
two strands of empowerment and constraints and provides the grounding
or justification (along with theories such as Gewirth’s) for the middle and
outer layers. Orend’s five objects of security, subsistence, and equality can
be incorporated into well-being (constraint), and recognition and freedom
can be incorporated into freedom (empowerment). The bulls eye or center
circle constitutes the ethical heart of human rights articles and their asso-
ciated rules and, without it, they would appear to be arbitrary and overly
specific and prescriptive. There are rights and duties at the various levels, but
they become increasingly prescribed through policy as you move outward
from the inner circle. It is my contention that the concept of dignity and its
constituent components provides correctional and forensic practitioners with
the ethical resources to deal with complex and subtle human rights issues in
daily practice and that the more concrete treaties, though important, are less
valuable because they are more specific and circumscribed. I now apply the
human rights model and ideas to offender rehabilitation.
The Application of Human Rights to Offender Rehabilitation
HUMAN RIGHTS, OFFENDERS, AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
I first make a few general points concerning the applications of human rights
ideas and norms to offenders. A first point concerns the issue of rights for-
feiture. The claim that offenders ought to be stripped of their human rights
rests on the assumption that rights entitlement is earned (Lippke, 2002).
Therefore, the argument goes, if a person commits a serious crime, he or
she may have their array of entitlements to human rights objects reduced or
even completely withdrawn. Continued access to goods such as education,
freedom of speech and movement, or health care is thought to depend on
whether citizenship obligations are met. Inflicting unjustified harm against
innocent members of the community is believed to breach that require-
ment and, therefore, the implicit social contract between offenders and the
state no longer holds. Simple humanitarian concerns are likely to mean that
individuals’ basic human needs are met but, in truth, this is more an act of
compassion or discretion by the state than an obligation. In my view, this
argument is mistaken. For one thing, it conflates the distinction between cit-
izenship rights and human rights. The former holds by virtue of a person’s
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membership of a community or country whereas the latter are derived from
his or her status as a human being (Miller, 2007). Though citizens’ rights
entitlement may be dependent on social standing and be withdrawn under
some circumstances, human rights are inviolate and can never be legiti-
mately taken or given up (Morsink, 2009). Furthermore, though some rights
such as freedom of movement may be justifiably curtailed when a person is
imprisoned, each restriction needs to be explicitly argued for rather than be
tampered with at the discretion of the state or correctional officials. Thus,
offenders are human rights holders and, as such, have justified entitlements
to social recognition, access to primary goods, and core basic freedoms (e.g.,
freedom of expression, conscience, etc).
Second, it is important to grasp that offenders are simultaneously
human rights–violators, duty bearers, and also human rights holders (Ward
& Birgden, 2007). The fact that offenders have often violated the human
rights of their victims is reflected in their punishment and loss of liberty.
By extending human rights and related protections to offenders, I do not
see any infringement on the public’s rights to safety: Rights imply duties,
and whatever entitlements are extended to offenders, these should always
be balanced against the core interests and basic human rights of others and
the safety of the community at large. The conceptual connection between
human rights entitlements and obligations maps neatly onto the twin aims
of strength-based approaches to offender rehabilitation, namely well-being
enhancement and risk reduction (see below). Thus, rehabilitation initiatives
that are underpinned ethically by a human rights perspective will automat-
ically look both to helping offenders turn their lives around and “making
good” (Maruna, 2001) while at the same time ensuring that the potential for
causing harm to members of the public is lessened. By adopting a human
rights framework, practitioners will encourage offenders to appreciate that
their interests and those of other member coincide to a considerable degree.
They will engage offenders in a dialogue that acknowledges their status
as rights holders and appreciates that the dignity of human beings calls
for respect and reason-based treatment rather than approaching them as
deviancy machines. Though it is a mistake to privilege the rights of offend-
ers over those of the community it is an equal error to automatically dismiss
their rights to basic goods as irrelevant or undeserved.
A third general point is that the application of the concept of human
rights to the criminal justice system should occur at all three levels out-
lined earlier. Concerning the outermost layer of the Ward and Birgden
model, the UDHR and the two related covenants contain a number of
articles that are relevant for the rights of prisoners. For example, article
10.3 of The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
states that prisoners should have the opportunity to participate in treatment
aimed to facilitate social rehabilitation and reformation (ICCPR, 1966). Other
useful documents are the Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners
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(1990), and The Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners
(1977).
With respect to the core human rights values and their elaboration into
the five sets of goods, the responsibilities here are moral rather then legal or
quasi-legal. The core values and their justifying theory provide practitioners
with a rich resource for reflection on the ethical aspects of their practice.
Understanding that human rights function to protect the agency of individ-
uals and, therefore, their dignity helps practitioners evaluate all aspects of
their work and to consider the ethical implications of rehabilitation.
Fourth, as noted by Perlin (2005), there appears to be a disconnec-
tion between forensic and correctional practice and human rights ideas
and their associated norms. He argues that this fracture is deeply prob-
lematic because it occurs within contexts wherein there are large power
imbalances, blurred roles, punitive and stigmatizing attitudes, and an overall
lack of respect for offenders’ rights (see also McCarthy, 2010). A significant
advantage of explicitly working with a human rights model whereby specific
norms are underpinned by the moral concepts of dignity and agency is that
it is easier for practitioners to identify and effectively respond to these ethical
hotspots.
Finally, strength-based approaches to working with offenders such as
the Good Lives Model (Ward & Maruna, 2007) have ethical advantages over
purely risk-oriented perspectives. Providing individuals with the core skills
and resources required to function in ways that reflect their dignity is likely
to both promote their capacity to achieve good lives and reduce their risk
to others (Ward & Maruna, 2007; Ward & Stewart, 2003). Furthermore, treat-
ment modules such as empathy training, cognitive skills, understanding the
offence process, social skills and intimacy training, and emotional regula-
tion are directly concerned with facilitating offenders’ abilities to accurately
infer, respond to, and appreciate the experiences and needs of others. The
acquisition of the capabilities to improve the quality of their own lives and
to respect those of others will necessarily involve recognition of the freedom
and well-being of other people—in a nutshell, their human rights.
HUMAN RIGHTS AND ASSESSMENT
I now comment on three assessment issues that have significant human
rights implications. The first concerns the need to ensure that the assessment
of offenders is competently undertaken and is also cognizant of their status
as rights holders. Second, appreciating that risk assessment is never simply
a matter of science; there is always an important value dimension as well.
Third, understanding that the process of assessment needs to take the needs
and rights of offender into account and not simply regard their interests as
peripheral to those of the rest of the community I briefly discuss each of
these issues in turn.
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First, assessment data and the resulting conclusions may have signifi-
cant implications for offenders’ future opportunities for rehabilitation and,
ultimately, their degree of freedom and well-being. Lower-risk offenders are
less likely to receive any treatment at all because of the perception that their
needs are unrelated to the possibility of subsequent offending (Andrews &
Bonta, 2003). The presence of significant mental health problems such as
social anxiety may receive less attention than they merit, given their poten-
tial impact on individuals’ level of well-being and social functioning (Ward
& Syversen, 2009). Moreover, offenders assessed as high risk may ultimately
end up being considered for civil commitment or subject to geographical
restrictions (Vess, 2009). Thus, extreme care should be exercised when
gathering information about individuals’ criminogenic needs, personal cir-
cumstances, and any additional problems. Practitioners ought to make sure
they know how to use forensic and correctional measures appropriately, be
adequately trained, and take into account in their subsequent case formula-
tion the relevant unique features of an offender’s functioning and personal
history. Failure to do all these things may result in incorrect risk estima-
tions and impoverished clinical explanations (Vess, 2005). Conceptualizing
assessment through a human rights framework should assist practitioners to
make sure any information gathered is of the highest quality possible and
that any subsequent decisions that restrict offenders’ freedom, and possibly
well-being, are rationally (and ethically) justified. An additional advantage of
applying a human rights model such as the Ward and Birgden one is that it
is much easier to develop a collaborative assessment strategy with offenders.
Work by Mann and Shingler (2006) suggests actively engaging sex offenders
as partners in the assessment process results in stronger therapeutic relation-
ships and can markedly boost motivation and treatment retention. It is also
likely to reduce defensiveness and yield better quality assessment data.
Second, the risk bands of risk assessment instruments and the threshold
constituting acceptable versus unacceptable levels of risk is partly a value-
based one (Denny, 2005; Monahan & Steadman, 1996). The concept of risk
revolves around judgments that a type of harm is likely to occur to a given
person within a specified time frame. It is evident that the concept of harm
is intimately connected to values and claims that certain actions will result
in lowered levels of well-being and/or increased pain or suffering. The rele-
vance of this observation for human rights is that political and social interests
may intrude in ways that are ethically unacceptable and that infringe offend-
ers’ human rights. For example, the claim that offenders are moral lepers
who ought to be securely contained is a frequently observed conservative
attitude, arguably underpinning extremely restrictive parole policies such as
geographical restrictions (Willis, Levenson, & Ward, 2010). In similar vein,
Miller and Morris (1988) argue that decisions concerning what are unaccept-
able levels of risk are social, political, and policy determinations rather than
psychological, empirical, or statistical ones. The upshot of the dependence
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of risk assessment norms for practitioners within the correctional and foren-
sic domain is that they should be aware of the potential for human rights
violations. Any argument for the restriction of offenders rights should be
explicitly stated and subject to ethical scrutiny by practitioners rather than
being allowed to exert an undetected influence under the guise of science.
Third, it should never be the case that the human rights of offenders
are automatically assumed to be of lesser importance than those of other
members of the community. This point follows from the core assumption
supporting human rights norms that all human beings have inherent dignity
that is acknowledged by, and reflected in, human rights treaties and ideas.
Unfortunately, the shift from a justice to a community protection model
within forensic psychology in the last few years has seriously eroded this
ideal. For example, Vess has recently stated in the context of sex offending
(2005) that
the community protection approach is less concerned about due pro-
cess, the proportionality of punishment to the crime, and the protection
of offenders’ liberty or privacy rights. . . . . . The primary goal of the com-
munity protection model is the incapacitation of sexual offenders for the
sake of public safety (p. 360).
The trouble with the privileging of the community interests over those
of the offenders without good reason is that it overrides the assumption of
the equal moral status of all human beings and creates situations wherein
human rights violations are more likely to occur. Though it may be perfectly
appropriate to impose severe restrictions on offenders in prison or living
in the community, the legitimacy of these need to be argued for on ethical
grounds and not simply assumed. The balancing of offenders’ entitlements
and obligations with those of the rest of the community is a complex and
subtle task and requires careful thought and due consideration. Practitioners
need to be careful that their professional roles and tasks are not hijacked by
the political and social agendas of other groups. Human rights cut both ways,
and their possession bestows entitlements to goods and services alongside
obligations or duty to respect others’ interests.
HUMAN RIGHTS AND TREATMENT
I now comment on four implications of our human rights model for offender
treatment within the correctional and forensic domains. The major implica-
tions are as follows: (a) importance of avoiding unjustified discrimination;
(b) dealing with the inevitable pressures toward paternalism and working
collaboratively wherever possible; (c) adopting a desistance rather than a
purely within-treatment program approach; and (d) working with offenders
to promote good or better lives rather than adopting a simple risk reduction
and management.
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Discrimination. According to human rights ideas and their associated
norms, it is wrong to discriminate against individuals on the basis of ethi-
cally irrelevant factors when allocating goods and services. The exact nature
of the discriminatory factors depends on the issue at hand in the context of
offending and rehabilitation Obviously, variables such as offenders ethnicity,
religious beliefs, sexual orientation, occupation, and gender are irrelevant,
and it would be wrong to exclude such individuals from rehabilitation pro-
grams purely upon the basis of their presence. More interesting factors are
those associated with the type and severity of the offence and offenders’
assessed level of risk (see the preceding). It is common for sex offenders to
be placed in protection wings due to the threat, and frequency, of assaults on
them by other prisoners. The difficulty is that the additional levels of security
needed to ensure their continued safety may mean they have less access to
goods such as joint leisure, vocational training, and educational resources
(Ward & Birgden, 2007). Though there may be good reasons for this, it is a
concern that sometimes such access is denied because it is easier for correc-
tional staff rather than being a necessary consequence of limited resources
(McCarthy, 2010). This is ethically unacceptable and may well be a viola-
tion of a human right to effective rehabilitation (ICCPR, 1966). Additionally,
the fact that an offender may have committed a particularly vicious crime
that warrants a long sentence and moral condemnation does not on its own
mean that he or she should be denied the opportunity to actively participate
in a reform process or legitimate claims to essential psychological and social
resources denied. Unfortunately, the attitude that high-risk offenders are not
“people like us” and therefore their needs and interests are of little ethi-
cal importance is widespread and (arguably) partially responsible for overly
harsh and restrictive punishment and correctional practices (McCarthy, 2010;
Ward & Laws, 2010). Practitioners have a responsibility to look carefully at
their work with offenders and ask themselves the following two questions:
(a) Are offenders being subject to unnecessarily restrictive and harsh liv-
ing conditions, and (b) Are they being denied legitimate access to program
resources because of what they have done and of their characteristics? For
example, psychopathy has been prematurely regarded by researchers to be
virtually untreatable and, as a consequence of this viewpoint, there has been
little sustained research into the development and evaluation of suitable pro-
grams for individuals diagnosed as psychopathic (Howells & Day, 2007). If
the answer is yes to either of these questions, I suggest there is a danger of
a human rights violation occurring.
Paternalism. The issue of paternalism has been surprisingly overlooked
in ethical analyses of offender rehabilitation and, if present, may pose a
strong threat to human rights (Glaser, in press; 2003). Paternalism has been
defined by Beauchamp and Childress (2009) as “The intentional overriding
of one person’s preferences or actions by another person, where the person
who overrides justifies this action by appeal to the goal of benefiting or of
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preventing or mitigating harm to the person whose preferences or actions
are overridden” (p. 208). In a standard risk-oriented rehabilitation program,
risk is topically construed as risk to the community and the offender, and
it is offenders’ preferences or goals that are overridden. From this perspec-
tive, when offenders’ well-being is thought to depend on their staying out
of prison and having their deviant characteristics eliminated or modified,
paternalism may be evoked as a justification. Thus, mandated assessment
and treatment, geographical restrictions, and civil commitment can all be
viewed as being partly in the offenders’ interests. Glaser (in press) has
recently argued that strength-based rehabilitation models are also at least
weakly paternalistic because they are based on practitioners assumptions
about what is in an offender’s best interests rather than what offenders
actually express. The ethical problem with paternalism is that it conflicts
with individuals’ autonomy and therefore threatens their dignity as ratio-
nal, self-determining individuals. In this type of situation, someone else
decides what a person should do and ignores what it is he or she wants.
The degree to which current rehabilitation initiatives for offenders are pater-
nalistic is contestable, but Glaser does make a strong and useful point. If
paternalism is unjustified on any particular occasion, it violates the auton-
omy or freedom requirement of human rights and therefore is ethically
unacceptable.
Desistance. Desistance research seeks to understand the change pro-
cesses outside of treatment that are associated with individuals’ turning away
from lives of crime and becoming reintegrated into the community (Ward
& Laws, 2010). Research indicates that desistance opportunities such as
employment, marriage, leisure, and social supports help offenders to restruc-
ture their self-conceptions in socially constructive and personally meaningful
ways (Laws & Ward, 2011; Maruna, 2001). Desistance is often defined as
a termination point, “the last officially recorded or self-reported offense”
(Kazemian, 2007, p. 9). However, it is more properly seen as a dynamic,
ongoing process. In essence, it is the state of stopping and staying stopped
that we refer to as “desistance” (Maruna, 2001). We have argued recently that
participating in well-structured rehabilitation programs increases the likeli-
hood that individuals will be more likely to engineer, or take advantage
of, “natural” desistance opportunities (e.g., employment, education, relation-
ships) and processes in the future (Laws & Ward, 2011). From a human rights
viewpoint, desistance-oriented rehabilitation initiatives are more responsive
to offenders’ specific needs and values and, therefore, practitioners should
be less inclined to use (unjustified) paternalistic and coercive interventions.
This is because the focus is on offenders’ social environments beyond the
correctional orbit, and therapeutic efforts are aimed to equip them with
strengths to capitalize on desistance opportunities in ways that are person-
ally meaningful and socially acceptable. A desistance approach also places
responsibility on the community to actively assist offenders undergo the
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process of reform and reconciliation, ultimately viewing it as a shared
responsibility—one that involves acknowledging offenders have (human
rights) entitlements to goods and service and a chance at better lives and
obligations to refrain from harmful actions.
Good lives plans. My final point builds upon the foregoing material
and asserts that all offender rehabilitation should be founded upon strength-
based intervention plans that incorporate their core commitments and also
addresses the need to protect the public. A strength-based rehabilitation
model aims to help offenders acquire the competencies and social oppor-
tunities and supports necessary to realize reflectively endorsed personal
goals. These goals will be derived from core human needs, personal abilities
and interests, and cultural resources and reflect individuals’ self-conceptions
(Ward & Maruna, 2007). I will not go into detail here but note that in a
number of previous papers and books, I have systematically described how
the good lives model of offender rehabilitation can provide clinicians with a
framework to assist in the construction of these plans with their constituent
intermediate and intrinsic gaols (e.g., Laws & Ward, 2011; Ward & Laws,
2010; Ward & Maruna, 2007; Ward & Stewart, 2003). The key point is that
a strength-based intervention plan will have a strong desistance focus and
have at its heart a clear description of offenders’ core values and their associ-
ated identities. For example, an indigenous individual who weights cultural
identity and knowledge acquisition most heavily might have an intervention
plan that involves going to university to learn about African-American history
and language and meeting with others like himself who are attempting to
turn their lives around. Risk management and reduction are sought through
the fashioning of better lives, and the personal commitments of individuals
are carefully factored in their plans in ways that are deeply responsive to
their agency and dignity as human beings. The advantage of strength-based
perspectives is that they are founded on human rights ideas and norms and
explicitly balance the interests and entitlements of offenders with those of
members of the public.
Strategies to Enhance Offenders’ Dignity
I now make a few comments about how practitioners can enhance offenders’
dignity in their day-to-day interactions with them. These suggestions can be
aligned with the core features of dignity discussed earlier: agency, well-
being, respect, and equal status. To recap, I have argued that the dignity
of human beings entails their equal moral worth and the ability to live in
ways that reflect this equal value. Although there is some overlap between
the four factors, they each make distinctive contributions to the question of
dignity and its enhancement.
First, it is important for practitioners to actively attempt to discover what
offenders’ personal commitments are and to identify their hopes, concerns,
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and aspirations in both an initial and ongoing basis. It is not enough to find
out what really matters to a person during the initial assessment and then to
implement treatment without checking back to (a) make sure things are pro-
ceeding as they would wish and (b) that nothing else of importance in their
lives has arisen that might result in setting new priorities or else derail the
agreed-upon intervention plan. Such actions are likely to signal to offenders
that their views are not important and result in their feeling disempowered
and cynical about therapists’ original proclamations to the contrary. One
way of avoiding this trap is to ask each individual on a weekly basis how
things are proceeding and whether he or she is happy with the progress.
Furthermore, it is a good idea for therapists to be thoroughly acquainted
with the details of all offenders’ personal circumstances and life histories
and their offence-related problems. This will make it easier to work collab-
oratively and to appreciate the unique life stories and perspectives of the
men or women they work with.
Second, practitioners ought to ensure that offenders’ basic needs and
living conditions are of an acceptable standard and do not fall below the
threshold required for a dignified human life. Clearly, stigmatization, social
exclusion, poor accommodation, lack of adequate dental and medical care,
social isolation, lack of support, and insufficient access to educational and/or
vocational opportunities are examples of threats to well-being. Some of these
threats may fall outside of a therapist’s role but are still of concern because of
their adverse impact on offenders social and psychological functioning. And
impaired functioning may well result in increased risk of reoffending. What
I have in mind here is to obtain concrete details of well-being-related factors
such as living conditions by making visits to cells and to accommodation
outside of prison, thus making it a professional responsibility to be familiar
with all aspects of an offender’s life outside of the therapy room. If problems
are detected in the well-being arena, it is imperative to talk with the offender
(agency requirement!) and any appropriate correctional and social agencies
about options for improving the situation. It is not enough to know there
are problems; it is incumbent on practitioners to attempt to do something
constructive about them.
Third, respect for offenders is directly communicated in the type of
language used and in associated nonverbal behavior when interacting with
them. Calling them by their preferred title (asking!) and using nondirec-
tive and open-end questions when working with groups and individuals
will clearly communicate that their viewpoints are valued and sought.
Furthermore, try to avoid being overly paternalistic and appearing dicta-
torial when it comes to the content and delivery of treatment plans. As with
non-offenders, effective engagement requires starting where people are and
not trying to bulldoze them into accepting what therapists consider (often
with good justification) are appropriate goals. Many of the interventions
likely to demonstrate respect for offenders are those of good therapeu-
tic practice, and their value for treatment has been recently confirmed by
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the pioneering work of researchers such as Marshall and his colleagues
(Marshall et al., 2003). Unfortunately, because of the overlap between pun-
ishment and rehabilitation initiatives evident within the correctional and
forensic arena, the requirement to align practice with therapeutic norms
can be overlooked (Ward & Salmon, 2009).
Finally, accepting that offenders have the same basic status as the rest
of the community because of their value as human beings is crucial to ethical
practice. Recognition respect of this nature does not mean overlooking the
fact that offenders have unjustifiably harmed members of the community or
minimizing their potential threat (Darwell, 2006). Rather, it means factoring
in the inevitable restrictions of liberty that arise from the fact they have
committed crimes and then explicitly taking their viewpoint and interests
into account when making decisions that affect their lives. In practical terms,
this means being careful to separate out issues of punishment from treatment
and working collaboratively with offenders to try and create outcomes that
are truly in their interests and those of the rest of the community. In some
jurisdictions, this can be extremely difficult because of the severe restrictions
placed on offenders both within correctional facilities and when men or
women are relapsed into the community (Vess, 2009). However, even in
these situations, it is possible to work in ways that are more or less cognizant
of offenders’ equal status. In risk assessment and post-release planning, this
might mean thinking carefully about relocation possibilities and to work
with groups such as Circles of Support to arrive at solutions that mesh with
what individuals want while dealing with reasonable safety concerns.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have argued that the concept of dignity and human rights
norms and ideas provide an ethical foundation for offender rehabilitation
initiatives. I have suggested that it is necessary to work with a complex con-
ception of human rights and to go beyond a simple reliance on treaties and
concrete norms. Rather, the concept of human dignity and its constituent
well-being and freedom (autonomy) components ought to be actively con-
sidered when working with offenders. Keeping an eye on this richer view of
human rights will assist practitioners to identity ethical hotspots and possible
rights violations that are frequently overlooked. Offenders are susceptible to
human rights violations because of their relative vulnerability and the fact
they are frequently housed in hostile environments. If we want individu-
als to become sensitive to the interests of others and to live more socially
responsible lives, we ought to treat them respectfully. It is my contention
that human rights theories and norms can help us to achieve this task and in
the end, become more caring and responsible practitioners and researchers
ourselves.
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
De
ak
in
 U
ni
ve
rs
it
y]
 A
t:
 0
0:
49
 1
4 
Ju
ne
 2
01
1
Human Rights 121
REFERENCES
Andrews, D. A., & Bonta, J. (2003). The Psychology of Criminal Conduct (3rd ed.).
Cincinnati, OH: Anderson.
Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners. (1990). Retrieved February 18, 2011
from http://www2.ohchr.org/English/law/pdf/basicprinciples.pdf.
Beauchamp, T. L. & Childress, J. F. (2009). Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 6th
edition. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Beyleveld, D., & Brownsword, R. (2001). Human dignity in bioethics and law. New
York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Boonin, D. (2008). The problem of punishment. New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press.
Bush, S. S., Connell, M. A., & Denny, R. L. (2006). Ethical practice in forensic psy-
chology: A systematic model for decision making. Washington, DC: American
Psychological Association.
Churchill, R. P. (2006). Human rights and global diversity. Upper Saddle River, NJ:
Pearson Prentice Hall.
Darwell, S. (2006). The second-person standpoint: Morality, respect, and account-
ability. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Day, A. & Ward, T. (2010). Offender rehabilitation as a value laden process.
International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 54,
289–306.
Denny, D. (2005). Risk and society. London, UK: Sage.
Donnelly, J. (2003). Universal human rights in theory and practice (2nd ed.).
London, UK: Cornell University Press.
Driver, J. (2006). Ethics: The fundamentals. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing.
Duff, R. A. (2001). Punishment, communication, and community. New York, NY:
Oxford University Press.
Freeden, M. (1991). Rights. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Freeman, M. (2002). Human Rights. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Gewirth, A. (1981). Reason and morality. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago
Press.
Gewirth, A. (1996). The community of rights. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago
Press.
Glaser, B. (2003). Therapeutic Jurisprudence: An ethical paradigm for therapists in
sex offender treatment programs. Western Criminology Review, 4, 143–154.
Glaser, B. (in press). Paternalism in the rehabilitation of sex offenders. Sexual Abuse:
A Journal of Research and Treatment.
Griffin, J. (2008). On human rights. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Haag, A. D. (2006). Ethical dilemmas faced by correctional psychologists in Canada.
Criminal Justice and Behavior, 33, 93–109.
Hohfeld, W. N. (1919). Fundamental legal conceptions. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press.
Howells, K., & Day, A. (2007). Readiness for treatment in high risk offenders
with personality disorders. Psychology, Crime & Law. Special Issue: Personality
Disorder and Offending, 13, 47–56.
Hudson, B. (2001). Human rights, public safety, and the probation service:
Defending justice in the risk society. The Howard Journal, 40, 103–113.
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
De
ak
in
 U
ni
ve
rs
it
y]
 A
t:
 0
0:
49
 1
4 
Ju
ne
 2
01
1
122 T. Ward
Ishay, M. R. (2004). The history of human rights. Berkley, CA: University of California
Press.
Kazemian, L. (2007). Desistance from crime: Theoretical, empirical, methodological,
and policy considerations. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 23, 5–27.
Laws, D. R., & Ward, T. (2011). Desistance from Sex Offending: Alternatives to
Throwing Away the Key. New York, NY: Guilford Press.
Lazarus, L. (2004). Contrasting prisoners’ rights: A comparative examination of
England and Germany. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Levenson, J., & D’Amora, D. (2005). An ethical paradigm for sex offender treatment:
Response to Glaser. Western Criminology Review, 6 , 145–153.
Lippke, R. L. (2002). Toward a theory of prisoners’ rights. Ratio Juris, 15, 122–145.
Mahoney, J. (2007). The challenge of human rights: Origin, development, and
significance. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing.
Malpas, J., & Lickiss, N. (Eds.). (2007). Perspectives on human dignity: A conversa-
tion. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer.
Mann, R. E., & Shingler, J. (2006). Collaboration in clinical work with sexual offend-
ers: Treatment and risk assessment. In W. L. Marshall, Y. M. Fernandez, L. E.
Marshall, & G. A. Serran (Eds.), Sexual offender treatment: Controversial issues
(pp. 225–239). John Wiley and Sons.
Maruna, S. (2001). Making good: How ex-convicts reform and rebuild their lives.
Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Marshall, W. L., Fernandez, Y. M., Serran, G. A., Mulloy, R., Thornton, D., Mann,
R. E., et al. (2003). Process variables in the treatment of sexual offenders.
Aggression and Violent Behavior: A Review Journal, 8, 205–234.
McCarthy, M. (2010). (Ed). Incarceration and human rights. Manchester, UK:
Manchester University Press.
Miller, D. (2007). National responsibility and global justice. Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press.
Miller, M., & Morris, N. (1988). Predictions of dangerousness: An argument for
limited use. Violence and Victims, 3, 263–283.
Monahan, J., & Steadman, H.J. (1996). Violent storms and violent people: How
meteorology can inform risk communication in mental health law. American
Psychologist, 51, 931– 938.
Morsink, J. (2009). Inherent human rights: Philosophical roots of the universal
declaration. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Nickel, J. W. (2007). Making sense of human rights (2nd ed.). Oxford, UK: Blackwell
Publishing.
Nussbaum, M. (2006). Frontiers of justice: Disability, nationality, species-
membership. Cambridge, UK: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights (1966). United Nations
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Retrieved February 18, 2011
from http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm
Orend, B. (2002). Human rights: Concept and context. Ontario, Canada: Broadview
Press.
Perlin, M. L. (2005, July). “With faces hidden while the walls were tightening”:
Applying international human rights standards to forensic psychology. Paper
presented at the 15th European Law and Psychology Conference, Vilnius,
Lithuania.
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
De
ak
in
 U
ni
ve
rs
it
y]
 A
t:
 0
0:
49
 1
4 
Ju
ne
 2
01
1
Human Rights 123
Smit, D. Z., & Snacken, S. (2009). Principles of European prison law and policy:
Penology and human rights. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, adopted August 30, 1955
by the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/611, annex I, E.S.C. res. 663C, 24
U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 11, U.N. Doc. E/3048 (1957), amended E.S.C.
res. 2076, 62 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 35, U.N. Doc. E/5988 (1977).
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/g1smr.htm
Sulmasy, D. P. (2007). Human dignity and human worth. In J. Malpas & N. Lickiss
(Eds.). Perspectives on human dignity: A conversation (pp. 9–18). Dordrecht,
The Netherlands: Springer.
United Nations. (1948). Universal declaration of human rights. In J. P. Martin &
R. Rangaswamy (Eds.), Twenty-five human rights documents. New York, NY:
Columbia University for the Study of Human Rights.
Vess, J. (2005). Preventive detention versus civil commitment: Alternative policies
for public protection in New Zealand and California. Psychiatry, Psychology, &
Law, 12, 357–366.
Vess, J. (2009). Fear and loathing in public policy: Ethical issues in laws for sex
offenders. Aggression and Violent Behavior, 14, 264–272.
Waldron, J. (2009). Dignity, rank, and rights: The 2009 Tanner Lectures at UC
Berkeley. New York, NY: New York University of Law.
Ward, T., & Birgden, A. (2007). Human rights and correctional clinical practice.
Aggression and Violent Behavior, 12, 628–643.
Ward, T., Gannon, T., & Vess, J. (2009). Human rights and ethical principles and
standards in forensic psychology. International Journal of Offender Therapy
and Comparative Criminology, 53, 126–144.
Ward, T., & Langlands, R. (2009). Repairing the rupture: Restorative justice and
offender rehabilitation. Aggression and Violent Behavior, 14, 205–214.
Ward, T., & Laws, D. R. (2010). Desistance from sexual offending: Motivating change,
enriching practice. International Journal of Forensic Mental Health, 9, 11–23.
Ward, T., & Maruna, S. (2007). Rehabilitation: Beyond the risk paradigm. London,
UK: Routledge.
Ward, T. & Moreton, G. (2008). Moral Repair with Offenders: Ethical Issues Arising
From Victimization Experiences. Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and
Treatment, 20, 305–322.
Ward, T., & Salmon, K. (2009). The ethics of punishment: Correctional practice
implications. Aggression and Violent Behavior, 14, 239–247.
Ward, T. & Stewart, C. A. (2003). The treatment of sex offenders: Risk management
and good lives. Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 34, 353–360.
Ward, T. & Syversen, K. (2009). Vulnerable agency and human dignity: An ethical
framework for forensic practice. Aggression and Violent Behavior, 14, 94–105.
Willis, G., Levenson, J., & Ward, T. (2010). Desistance and attitudes towards sex
offenders: Facilitation or hindrance? Journal of Family Violence, 25, 545–556.
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
De
ak
in
 U
ni
ve
rs
it
y]
 A
t:
 0
0:
49
 1
4 
Ju
ne
 2
01
1
